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I. Introduction 
It is widely thought that income distribution worsened during
the economic growth which took place in Brazil during the 1960's. This
contention is hardly undocumented. At least four studies by respected
development economists Fishlow [7], Langoni [10], Adelman and Morris [ 1 ],
and Chenery et. al [4] present data supporting this conclusion. Fishlow,
for example, reports an increase in the Gini coefficient from 0.59 to 0.63
and a rise in the income share of the richest 3.2% from 27% to 32%. 
In my paper ,rA Re-examination of Brazilian Economic Development
in the 1960' s" [5], which I subsequently revised and retitled "Who Benefits
from Economic Development? --- A Re-examination of Brazilian Growth in the
1960s" [6], I found that the entire income distribution shifted, benefiting
every income class, the proportion of the economically active population
with incomes below the poverty level (as defined by Brazilian standards)
declined during the decade, those who remained poor were less poor than
before in absolute terms, and the rate of growth of income among "the poor"
was at least as great as the rate of growth among the non-poor. From these
findings, I concluded that "the poor" did benefit from Brazilian economic
growth in the 1960's. 
These results came as a surprise to me, and so I did not expect
that my conclusion --- that Brazil seemed to do better on the income dis­
tribution front than many observers had originally thought --- would be
received uncritically by others. On the other hand, neither did I expect
to receive critical commentaries before the paper had even been published.
Already, three challenges have been issued and circulated by Professors
Porter [11] and Bacha [3] and Doctors Ahluwalia, Dulay, and Pyatt [2]. Each 
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challenge is thoughtful and imaginative. Each performs new calculations 
concerning the distribution of income in Brazil in 1960 and 1970. And each 
fundamentally disagrees with my conclusion on the distribution of the 
benefits of Brazilian economic growth. 
In what follows, I hope to convince the reader that my point 
that the poor shared in Brazilian economic growth in the 1960's --- is 
robust to these criticisms and that the alternative position has not been 
substantiated. Nevertheless, there continues to be a great deal of severe 
poverty in Brazil, which my study in no way tries to condone. I hope 
the reader will interpret what follows in that light. 
II. What the Re-examination Does and Does Not Re-examine 
Let me begin by stating what I did.!}£! try to do. 
First and foremost, I should make clear that I have not challenged 
the legitimacy of any of the underlying figures on income distribution used 
by previous writers. I have used Fishlow's figures in preference to Langoni's 
for both a practical and a substantive reason. The practical reason is that 
Fishlow's study has been more widely-cited and his data more widely-used 
than those of Langoni,at least among English-speaking economists. The 
substantive reason is that Langoni excluded from consideration those persons 
in the economically active population with zero incomes, while Fishlow 
included them. For purposes of understanding the effect of growth on income 
distribution, I wanted to see whether growth reduced the rate of open 
unemployment and drew more of the population into the cash income sector. 
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Hence, I chose to use Fishlow's data, which allows measurement of change 
of the zero income population. 
Second, I have not challenged any of the calculations of relative 
income inequality indices. I accept the reports by Fishlow, Langoni, and 
others that relative income inequality increased (whether measured by the 
Gini coefficient, income share of the richest x%, decile shares, or some 
other index). Where I differ with existing studies is over the appropriate­
ness of the class of relative inequality measures as a whole for studying 
changing income distributions in growing economies. I return to this 
point below. 
Third, my re-examination should not be understood as in any way 
attempting to justify the types of political measures adopted in Brazil 
toward the objective of economic recovery and growth. I have stated my 
position clearly in both versions of the paper and see no need to repeat 
it here. 
Finally, I have not tried to speculate on what would have happened 
had Brazil followed some other type of development strategy. The task of 
chronicling how the income distribution might have been affected (for 
better or worse) had some alternative policies been pursued is best 
left to others more expert on the Brazilian economy than I. 
Let me now say what I did try to do. The task I set for myself 
was to describe how income distribution did in fact change. My question 
was: who benefited from economic development, or more precisely, how did 
the income position of the poor change as compared with the non-poor? In 
answering this questio~ past studies of Brazil followed upon the Nobel-
prize winning tradition of Professor Kuznets and used relative income measures. 
Consequently, when those authors concluded that income distribution in 
Brazil worsened, theirs was a relativistic statement based on the full 
range of observed incomes. In contrast to the accepted tradition, I 
chose to use a methodology based on absolute poverty rather than relative 
incomes, and therein lies the essence of my re-examination and the qualita­
tive difference between my results and those of earlier researchers. I 
accept their facts on changes in relative income inequality, but do not 
share in their interpretation, since I give greater weight in my judgment 
to other facts (those concerning absolute poverty) which previous studies 
overlooked. 
III. What the Controversy is All About 
None of the commentators on my paper has taken issue with the 
absolute poverty approach per se. All appear willing to define a constant 
real poverty line and to examine changes in the numbers of persons above 
or below the line and the average absolute incomes received by eacho Thus, 
agreement seems to have been reached on the validity of the absolute poverty 
approach in principle. 
At issue is how well I have executed the absolute poverty approach 
in practice. The principal objection raised in the commentaries concerns 
the correctness of the procedure I followed for interpolating incomes 
. h" . 1 lwit in an income c ass. The problem I was faced with and had to resolve 
1
I think the commentators 8re entirely justified in calling my data 
approximations into question. We should assess the suitability of data and 
the appropriateness of estimation procedures far more often than we do. 
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was the fact that none of the sources of income distribution data for 
Brazil (whether those of Fishlow, Langoni, Jain, or whomever) had comparable 
income brackets for 1960 and 1970. In other words, taking the poverty line 
as NCr. $2,100 in 1960 units, and allowing for an inflation factor of 3.53, 
it was impossible to obtain an exact figure for the percentage of the 
population below NCr. $7,413 (= $2,100 x 3.53) from any published source. 
In the absence of the microeconomic data, I was forced to approximate the 
share of the population below this amount and also to estimate their income 
share. The interpolation procedure I adopted applied a linear approximation 
to the population frequency within each bracket. For example, the first 
positive income bracket in 1970 runs from Oto 2.8 constant NCr.$. Applying 
the linear approximation, 2.1/2.8 of the population in the 0-2.8 category 
was assigned to the 0-2.1 category and the remaining O. 7/2.8 to the next 
higher category. 
In retrospect, this was a rather poor way to go about it. My 
· conclusion in the original version (p. 10) was that 11 the incomes of 'the 
poor' grew at a rate double that of the 'non-poor'"• In his comment [11], 
Professor Porter observed that my interpolation procedure assigned the 
average income in that category to all persons within that bracket. Since 
the poorer x% must have received less than the richer x%, Professor Porter 
concluded (rightly) that I had overstated the income gains of "the poor." 
Consequently, the conclusion in the original draft that the growth rate 
of incomes among the poor was double that of the non-poor was too strong, 
since the true figure was necessarily lower. 
The question that naturally arose then was how great was the bias 
introduced by my interpolation procedure. As I shall show below, if we 
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accept the legitimacy of Fishlow's data, it is impossible for the alterna­
tive conclusion --- that the poor may have benefited proportionately less 
than the non-poor --- to be the case under any set of assumptions or 
interpolation procedures. 
It is probably worth repeating that what we have here is a 
disagreement over how to best approximate the necessary figures with 
inadequate data, not a conceptual disagreement on how to treat the ideal 
data. The data problem could easily be resolved if we had either a public 
use sample with the microeconomic data or a special tabulation of the 
income distribution conformable to Fishlow's (or Langoni's) definitions. 
Unfortunately, we do not. 
IV. Income Growth of the Poor and A Proof of the Impossibility of the 
Alternative Conclusion Using Fishlow's Data 
The purpose of this section is to establish the following result: 
If we accept the validity of the income distribution data presented 
in Fishlow [7], the poor must have received income gains at least as great 
as those of the non-poor. Under no set of assumptions can the alternative 
conclusion --- that the poor may have benefited proportionately less than 
the non-poor --- be sustained. 
The proof goes along the following lines. I had assumed that 
incomes within the lowest positive income bracket were equally distributed. 
This is clearly one extreme assumption. The other alternative extreme 
assumption is that incomes within that bracket are distributed as 
unequally as possible. I shall show that even under this most extreme 
alternative assumption, the poor could not have received a smaller percentage 
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income increase than the non-poor. 
Proof: In my work, I assumed that the poorest 75% of the econ­
omically active population in the 0 - 2.8 category received 75% of that 
group's income. In objecting to that assumption, Professor Porter 
illustrated a situation where the richest 25% in the 0 - 2.8 bracket are 
assumed to receive 50% of that group's income and the poorest 75% receive 
the other 50%0 He calculated that the average earnings of the poor would 
rise by only 3%, while those of the non-poor would rise by 31%. This 
example, if valid, would destroy my earlier conclusions. Let me now prove 
the impossibility of Porter's example. 
The following data for 1970 are derived from Fishlow's original 
data, reproduced in Table 1 of 11A Re-examinationoo••": 
Undeflated Mean Income Deflated Mean Income 
Income in Bracket, Income in Bracket, 
Bracket Undeflated Bracket Deflated 
None (0/11. 7%) = 0 None 0 
1 - 100 (8. 0%/31. 7%) X 2580 1 = 65.04 0 - 2.83 1. 84 
101 - 150 (6. 2%/12. 8%) X 258.1 = 124.92 2. 83 - 4. 25 3.54 
151 - 200 (10.6%/15.6%) X 258.1 = 175.25 4. 25 - 5.66 4. 96 
Mean incomes within brackets are calculated as the income share of that group 
as a fraction of population share multiplied by mean income. 
The first two columns are deflated by 35.32 to be comparable with 
1960 data. (See footnote 1, p. 6, of "A Re-examination••• " or footnote 2, 
p. 7 of rrWho Benefits••• ") If the richest 25% of the 0 - 2.83 group were 
to receive 50% of the income, their income total would equal 50% x 1.84 x 
31. 7% P = 29.2% P. Since total income is 7.31 P, their share is 
(29.2%P)/7.31 P = 3.99%. If 7.925% (=25% x 31. 7%) of the population· 
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receives 3.99% of the income and the mean is 7.31, the mean of the richest 
7. 31 (3. 99%)25% of the 0 - 2.83 group is then = 3.68, which exceeds the
7. 925% 
upper limit of their category (2.83). Thus, it is impossible for the 
richest 1/4 to receive as much as 1/2 the income in their bracket, as in 
Professor Porter's example. 
How much can they possibly receive? Let a equal the maximum share 
of the O - 2.83's income which could be received by the richest 25% within 
that category. The richest 25%' s income is given by a(l. 84) (31. lo/c,P) = 
2.83 (1/4 x 31. 7%P). Solving, we find a= .3845. Thus, the richest 25% 
within that bracket could receive at most 38.45% of that bracket's income, 
and the remaining 75% of the people would receive 61.55% of the income. 
The poorer 75% in that bracket would than have a mean income of 
• 6155 (. 5832P) = 1.51.75% (31. 7% P) 
From these data, we may compute the mean income of the .poorest 
35a5% of the population, under the assumption that the richest 25% of those 
in the O - 2a83 bracket earn at the maximum of the bracket. We find 
-70 Min 23. 775% = X 1.51 = 1.01.yp 35.475% 
The superscript Min denotes that this is the minimum possible value of yp 70 
under the maintained assumptions. Turning now to the non-poor, 
-70Max
for we haveYn ' 
70 70 7035.475% P (1.01) + 64.525% P y
n 
. - 70Max
from which we obtain y_ = 10. 77. 
n 
9. 
- 60 - 60For 1960, = • 78 and 8. 30. Hence,yp yn = 
- 70 - 60 
yp yp 1.01 - • 78 = = 30%,- 60 • 78 
Yp 
and 
10. 77 - 8. 30 
a = 30%,8. 30 
and the percentage increases are exactly equal. 
From these calculations, we find that it is impossible for the 
poor to have received a smaller percentage income increase than the non-
poor, given that the richest 25% in the O - 2.83 range are assumed to 
receive the maximum allowable income in that bracket. 
Of course, there is nothing sacred about the selection of 25% as 
the upper income group. More generally, we may ask: if we assume the 
greatest possible inequality within the O - 2.83 bracket, could the poorest 
37.0% (which corresponds to the percentage below the poverty line in 1960) 
possibly receive less income in 1970 than in 1960? It is easily shown that 
the answer is negative. Let us define Q as the maximum share of the 
0 - 2.83's income which could be received by the richest 0 percent. Then, 
. Q 
1.849 = 2.830. or 0 = 1.54. The most unequal possible income distribution 
is when 9 ~ 1, and therefore 0 -> .649; the remaining 35.1% of the 
persons in that bracket would receive nearly zero incomes. Thus, with the 
greatest possible inequality within the O - 2.83 category, the 1970 income 
distribution would be 
0 
Income % of Population 
11. 7% 
0 35. 1% X 31. 7% = 11.1% 
2. 83 64.9% X 31. 7% = 20.6% 
2. 83 56.6% 
The.minimum value of the income received by the poorest 37.0% equals 
> 
2.83 x (37.0% - 22.8%) P, and their minimum share is this figure divided 
by total income (7.31 P). This minimum share is 5.49o/~ Hence, under the 
most extreme assumption, the income share of the poorest 37.0% definitely 
did not fall in Brazil between 1960 and 1970, and appears to have risen 
by 0.3o/~ Since real national income per capita rose by 32%, the real 
5incomes of the poorest 37.0% rose by at least 40%. (( 5;; x 1.32) - 1). 
Furthermore, the more equal the distribution of income within the O - 2.83 
bracket, the greater the percentage income gain of the very poorest during 
the economic growth of Brazil in the 1960's. Thus, it could not be that the 
incomes of the poor grew more slowly than those of the non-poor. 
Q. E. D. 
V. On the Inconsistency Between Actual Income Distribution Data and 
Fitted Data and the Conclusions Therefrom. 
In their comments [2] Ahluwalia, Duloy, and Pyatt (hereafter 
A-D-P) purported to show that even the softened conclusion --- that the 
poor had income gains at least as great as the non-poor --- was incorrect. 
Their arguments follow along two lines: 
(1) A critique of the particular interpolation assumptions I made, 
and (2) the results of an analysis based on fitted Lorenz curves. I have 
already considered their first point in the last section. This section 
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concerns their second point. 
A-D-P make use of data calculated by Shail Jain [8]. These data 
pertain not to the actual income distribution but rather to a fitted dis­
tribution, based on a procedure for estimating Lorenz curves from grouped 
data suggested by Kakwani and Podder [9]. A-D-P find 11 radically 
different estimates of the growth of income of the poor. [A-D-P' s] 
estimate implies that the mean income of the poor rose from 77.63 in 1960 
to 82.67 in 1970 an increase of 6.5 percent compared to an increase 
in mean income of 32 percent. Against this, [Fields'] estimate implies 
an increase in mean income of the poor of 62 percentl" 
After a careful review of the A-D-P calculations, I am convinced 
that the data fitted by Jain do in fact imply the conclusions A-D-P have 
drawn. Let us recall, however, that the Jain data used by A-D-P are 
estimates. I will now show that the estimated data systematically under­
state the actual growth in mean income among the pooro 
(i) As compared with the actual income distribution, A-D-P over­
state the income of the poor in 1960. 
Proof: In 1960, the poor (defined as those with incomes less than 
Cr$ 2. 1) actually received 5.2% of total income. In fact, 37.0% of the 
population had incomes below that level. Next, A-D-P estimate that the 
poorest 38% received 5. 75% of the incomeo This means that the 38th 
percentile is estimated to have received 0.55% of the income. However, the 
next 14o4% of the population received 7.0% of the income, or less than 0.5% 
per percentile. Thus, the income of the poor in 1960 was overstated. 
(ii) As compared with the actual income distribution, A-D-P under­
state the income of the poor in 1970. 
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Proof: In 1970, the poorest 43.4% of the population received 8.0% 
of the income. A-D-P estimate that 6.0% of the income was received by the 
poorest 40o/~ Hence, the 3.4% of the population between 40.0% and 43.4% are 
estimated to have received 2.0% of the income, or approximately 0.65% per 
percentile. Since that income bracket included 12.8% of the population who 
received 6.2% of the income, this estimate implies that the remaining 9.4% 
of the people at the upper end of that income bracket must have received 
4.2% of the income, which gives an average of about 0.45% of the income 
per percentile. Thus, according to their estimates, the poorer people in 
the 101-150 bracket are estimated to have received incomes which are 50% 
higher than the incomes received by the richer persons in that bracket, 
which is clearly impossible. 
(iii) From (i) and (ii), it follows that the data used for the 
A-D-P calculations understate the growth of income of the poor in Brazil 
between 1960 and 1970. Q.E.D. 
The difficulties encountered with these data derived from the 
fitted Lorenz curve call into question the estimating procedure itself. 
As mentioned above, A-D-P's estimates are based on figures calculated by 
Jain [8] using the procedure of Kakwani and Fodder [9], hereafter referred 
to as K-P. Without going through K-P's methodology, the precision of the 
values calculated by Jain is subject to doubt for the following reasons: 
(i) K-P present four methods for estimating Lorenz curves. Their 
simplest method (Method I) utilizes ordinary least squares (OLS). It is 
apparent from the Lorenz curve itself that the assumption of homoscedasticity 
in OLS is not likely to be fulfilled, which would render the OLS estimates 
inefficient, although still consistent. Yet, this inefficient procedure 
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(with correspondingly larger errors in estimation) is the procedure used 
by Jain and accepted by A-D-P, which might explain part of the inconsis­
tency between the actual and income fitted distributions. 
(ii) A second difficulty is that the Jain computations are based 
. • . "-\."· •- .,. I 
on decile groupings. Yet, their accuracy is called into question by K-P s 
observation of income groups from 11 to 20 improves the accuracy of the 
technique." This, of course, pinpoints the whole issue that what goes on 
within. certain deciles (the third and fourth) is critical to the calculations. 
(iii) Most importantly, even the most efficient of the K-P 
procedures (Method IV) does not do a very good job of predicting the 
incomes at the extreme lower end of the distribution, which is the concern 
in Brazilo Based on 11 groups, K-P estimate the share of the poorest 5% 
in Australia as .5857% of total income, when in fact they received. 767%, 
a percentage differential of some 20o/~ Thus, despite the goodness of fit 
2(as measured by R s in the neighborhood of 0.99) for the Jain regressions 
for all 81 countries, the particular prediction associated with the value 
pop. = 5% is in error by a rather large amount. Might predictions of the 
income shares at the lower ends in Brazil not also be in error by similar 
orders of magnitude? 
In sunnnary, the claim by A-D-P that the growth of incomes in 
Brazil among the poor was less than among the non-poor is based on data 
fitted hy a procedure which we have reason to believe is not very precise 
and which furthermore has h~en shown to be inconsistent with actual data on 
at least two counts. Since small errors in the overall fit might well make 
large differences in the particular values with which we are concerned, and 
since the fitted data differ considerably from the actual data in a systematic 
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fashion supportive of the A-D-P result, it does not appear that the A-D-P 
claim has been decisively established nor my conclusion convincingly 
refuted. 
VI. On Comparing the Poor and the Non-Poor. 
A somewhat different sort of critique is that of Professor Bacha 
[3]. Bacha accepts my calculations concerning the growth in average 
incomes among the poor as compared with the non-poor, but disagrees with 
my interpretation. His critique consists of two main points which I shall 
try to refute below. He writes: 
(1) "Dividing up the economically active population in three 
equivalent income intervals, we characterize the process of income concen­
tration in Brazil during the sixties by the facts that the proportion of 
the poorest category increased from 62 to 71 percent of the labor force; 
the share of the labor force in the intermediate interval.•• decreased 
from 32 to 21 percent between 1960 and 1970; finally, the share of the 
labor force in the upper income interval went up from 6 to 8 percent in 
the same period." 
(2) "Swollen in numbers, from 62 to 71 percent of the working 
force, the lowest income earners also increased their share in total income 
from 22 to 27 percent. Proportionally, the increase in numbers was less 
than the gains in income; hence the average income of the "poor" went up by 
more than the overall average. But this••• is a mere statistical artifact." 
Beginning with Professor Bacha's first point, the key statement is 
the term "equivalent income intervals." Bacha alleges that the income interval 
"less than 2. 1 1960 Cro $" is equivalent to the bracket "less than 99 1970 Cr.$. rr 
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To arrive at this conclusion, he used a formula developed in the early work 
of Langoni: 
(l+n)(l+r), 
where U2 i is the upper limit of the i'th income interval, n is the rate of 
inflation between 1960 and 1970, and r is the real rate of growth of per 
capita gross domestic product between these same years. Indeed, with 
(l+n) = 35.32 and r=32%, the value 99 is obtained. However, since it is 
blown up by (l+r), this figure can hardly be said to define incomes 
which are equivalent to one another or to define a constant real poverty 
1 . 11.ne. Thus, Bacha's conclusion that the proportion of the poorest 
category increased from 62 to 71 percent of the labor forceir is not based 
on a constant poverty line and consequently should not be given serious 
consideration. 
We can, however, recalculate equivalent 1970 income intervals 
by dividing each value in Bacha's Table 1, Column 8, by l+r = 1.32, or 
equivalently, multiplying the values in Column 1 by 35.32. Interestingly, 
we find that the fourth income bracket terminates at 158 Cr.$, which 
conveniently permits comparison with the economically active population 
in the first three categories. According to this calculation, in 1970, 
no more than 55.3% of the economically active population had incomes 
below 155 Cr._$. (This figure corresponds to 4.5 Cr.$ in 1960.) The 
1
It is instructive to note that Langoni performed this calculation 
only in the preliminary version of his book. Is it possible that the reason 
he dropped it was that UZi1960(l+n)(l+r) represents greater purchasing power 
than U2 i 1970? 
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percentage below that figure in 1960 was 62.1%. Combining these with the 
results presented in my paper, we have: 
Percentage of economically active 
population below 2.1 Cr.$, 1960: 37.0% 
Percentage of economically active 
population below 2.1 Cr.$, 1970: 35.5% 
Percentage of economically active 
population below 4.5 Cr.$, 1960: 62.1% 
Percentage of economically active 
population below 4. 5 Cr.$, 1970: 55.3% 
Professor Bacha's assertion that the low income group got larger is thus 
refuted regardless of the definition used. 
Turning now to Bacha's second point, I would argue that the fact 
that the average income of the poor went up is not a statistical artifact, 
as he claims. He presents a simple economy with three persons a, band c 
with incomes at time t such that x t> x. > x >x , where xis a constant a bt ct 
poverty line. Suppose that at time v-1:-t, a positive income transfer from 
person b to person a has taken place, so that x > x> x. > x • Professor av bV CV 
Bacha notes that although income distribution worsens in this example due 
to the regressive transfer, average incomes rise in both income classes. 
Thus, an increase in average incomes among the poor could be a statistical 
artifact concealing a deteriorating income distribution. For this reason, 
Professor Bacha dismisses as irrelevant both my finding and his finding 
that the average income of the poor went up by more than the overall average. 
would argue that the finding is not irrelevant for the very 
simple reason that in Professor Bacha's example, the size of the low income 
group gets larger, while in the actual data, the low income group becomes 
I 
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smaller. I would challenge him to produce an artifactual example with the 
low income group getting smaller and their average incomes rising, yet the 
overall income position of the poor deteriorating absolutely. Since I 
cannot think how such a situation could come about, I would maintain my 
earlier position that the increase in income share of the lower income 
group does reflect an ec.onomically-meaningful improvement. 
VII. Concluding Points 
A-D-P, in their note, raised the possibility of examining 
changes in the distribution of income amongst families rather than indiv­
iduals. Fishlow's data did not permit the analysis of families. In light 
of the fact that they and their colleagues at the World Bank have in the 
past accepted the legitimacy of Fishlow's conclusions without question, I 
didn't think it was necessary to justify the use of Fishlow's data now. 
Professor Bacha, I trust, will find that the contributions of 
Brazilians and Brazilianists have ·been suitably accounted for in ''Who 
Receives the Benefits••• " [6]. His speculation about the impact of 
changes in the distribution of non-cash income merits serious analysis when 
and if the data permit, and I too await the results of such a study0 
Professor Porter devoted much of his comment to the more general 
point that the Gini coefficient may not be an adequate measure of distri­
butional change. His objections are valid ones. But more fundamentally, 
the question is more than just irone more measure showing something else." 
At issue is how to translate the general concerns which many of us share for 
the distributional consequences of growth into suitable form. Perhaps the 
major lesson from the debate over Brazil is that economic science does not yet 
provide a satisfactory answer. My critics would undoubtedly agree. 
18. 
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